skills/reason-machines/security-skills/fort-firewall-malware-repository-detection/Gen Agent Trust Hub
fort-firewall-malware-repository-detection
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download the contents of a repository identified as malicious via
git clone https://github.com/BinayRAj-boop/fort-firewall-security-fix. This action brings trojanized installers and malware loaders into the agent's filesystem. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes system commands including
git clone,find,grep,gh, andcurlto interact with the malicious repository and perform reporting tasks to external APIs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests and analyzes untrusted data from external GitHub repositories.
- Ingestion points: Repository metadata (topics, creation dates) and
README.mdcontent are retrieved viagh repo viewandgit clone. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands are present in the analysis logic.
- Capability inventory: File system writes (cloning), subprocess execution (git, grep, find, gh), and network operations (curl, git).
- Sanitization: The skill uses regex matching for identification but lacks generic sanitization for the untrusted content being processed.
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill documentation encourages the use of environment variables for
GITHUB_TOKENandVIRUSTOTAL_API_KEY. While placeholders are used, this promotes a pattern of storing sensitive credentials in a shell environment where they may be exposed to other processes or logged. - [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a discrepancy between the author identified in the platform context ('reason-machines') and the author stated within the skill content ('ara.so'), which can be deceptive regarding the origin and trustworthiness of the security tool.
Audit Metadata