jellyfin-security-plugin

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent or user to fetch a plugin manifest and a ZIP archive from an unverified third-party GitHub repository (ZL154/JellyfinSecurity).
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The manual installation instructions facilitate the download and extraction of potentially arbitrary code into a server's plugin directory, which is executed when the host service restarts.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides a shell snippet that uses curl to download a ZIP file and unzip to extract it into the system's plugin directory (/var/lib/jellyfin/plugins/).
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The installation process involves executing commands like chown and systemctl restart, which modify system-level file ownership and control background services, requiring administrative access.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external authentication data (OIDC claims) and logs (audit events), which could act as a vector for malicious instructions if the upstream identity provider or user accounts are compromised.
  • Ingestion points: OIDC callback parameters and audit log query services (AuditLogService).
  • Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the configuration or implementation examples to delimit untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: Shell command execution (installation scripts), file writes (plugin configuration), and network operations (OIDC and SMTP).
  • Sanitization: While k-anonymity is mentioned for password hashing, no specific sanitization is described for OIDC userinfo claims before they are integrated into the system context.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 05:07 PM