jellyfin-security-plugin
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent or user to fetch a plugin manifest and a ZIP archive from an unverified third-party GitHub repository (
ZL154/JellyfinSecurity). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The manual installation instructions facilitate the download and extraction of potentially arbitrary code into a server's plugin directory, which is executed when the host service restarts.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The documentation provides a shell snippet that uses
curlto download a ZIP file andunzipto extract it into the system's plugin directory (/var/lib/jellyfin/plugins/). - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The installation process involves executing commands like
chownandsystemctl restart, which modify system-level file ownership and control background services, requiring administrative access. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external authentication data (OIDC claims) and logs (audit events), which could act as a vector for malicious instructions if the upstream identity provider or user accounts are compromised.
- Ingestion points: OIDC callback parameters and audit log query services (AuditLogService).
- Boundary markers: None explicitly defined in the configuration or implementation examples to delimit untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: Shell command execution (installation scripts), file writes (plugin configuration), and network operations (OIDC and SMTP).
- Sanitization: While k-anonymity is mentioned for password hashing, no specific sanitization is described for OIDC userinfo claims before they are integrated into the system context.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata