openosint-ai-osint-framework
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The documentation instructs users to use
sudoto move a downloaded binary to a system directory, which is a privilege escalation pattern that requires administrative rights. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill suggests an installation method for Ollama that pipes a remote script directly to the shell (
curl -fsSL https://ollama.com/install.sh | sh), a high-risk pattern for executing code from external servers. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The framework fetches binaries and scripts from various external repositories including GitHub and the Ollama domain during installation and troubleshooting.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The framework relies on executing several external CLI tools such as holehe, sherlock, and sublist3r as subprocesses to perform its OSINT functions.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The framework ingests search results, breach records, and social metadata from 11 different external OSINT sources through various tool wrappers.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to separate the untrusted data from the agent's core instruction set.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands, perform network requests, and write report files, creating an exploitable surface if the ingested data contains malicious instructions.
- Sanitization: The skill description provides no information on how the data retrieved from external platforms is sanitized or validated before being processed by the AI agent.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: https://ollama.com/install.sh - DO NOT USE without thorough review
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata