supabase-pentest-skills
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill documentation instructs the user to download a remote configuration file (
CLAUDE.md) from a specific GitHub repository (yoanbernabeu/supabase-pentest-skills). Since files likeCLAUDE.mdoften serve as behavioral instructions for AI agents, this mechanism allows the agent's logic to be updated from a remote, untrusted source. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill frequently references shell commands and
curloperations for environment setup, reproduction of findings (viacurl-commands.sh), and package installation vianpx. It encourages the agent to perform active network and file system operations based on user-supplied target URLs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection due to its core functionality.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches and analyzes external web content (HTML and JavaScript) from target URLs to detect Supabase configurations and extract API keys.
- Boundary markers: There are no explicit markers or instructions to ignore embedded prompts within the data fetched from the target websites.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write to the local file system (evidence logs, context files) and perform network requests.
- Sanitization: No input sanitization or content filtering is defined for the data retrieved from external URLs.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill is designed to search for and extract high-sensitivity information, including service role keys (which bypass security policies), JWTs, and database connection strings. While this is the intended purpose of a pentesting tool, the extraction and storage of these credentials in local files (
.sb-pentest-context.json) represents a significant data handling risk.
Audit Metadata