vibe-pentest-ai-security-testing
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires cloning a full codebase from a third-party repository (
github.com/ok-helloworld/vibe-pentestorgitee.com/ok-helloworld/vibe-pentest) which is not an officially trusted organization or well-known service vendor. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies heavily on
subprocess.runandsubprocess.Popento execute multiple Python scripts (fingerprint.py,admin_scanner.py,run_katana.py,prepare_agent_findings.py,generate_report.py) downloaded from the external repository. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Playwright's
page.evaluate()to execute arbitrary JavaScript within a browser context for session extraction and authorization header capture. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection because its core function is to ingest and process untrusted data from external web applications.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the system via the Katana crawler, which saves results to
workspace/crawled_anonymous.jsonl, and through the multi-agent findings stored inworkspace/findings/*.json. - Boundary markers: None identified; the skill directly processes crawler output to map attack surfaces.
- Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including file system writes (
workspace/), network requests viahttpxandrequests, and browser automation viaplaywright. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the content discovered by the crawler before it is passed to the specialized AI agents for vulnerability analysis.
Audit Metadata