vibe-pentest-ai-security-testing

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires cloning a full codebase from a third-party repository (github.com/ok-helloworld/vibe-pentest or gitee.com/ok-helloworld/vibe-pentest) which is not an officially trusted organization or well-known service vendor.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies heavily on subprocess.run and subprocess.Popen to execute multiple Python scripts (fingerprint.py, admin_scanner.py, run_katana.py, prepare_agent_findings.py, generate_report.py) downloaded from the external repository.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses Playwright's page.evaluate() to execute arbitrary JavaScript within a browser context for session extraction and authorization header capture.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is highly susceptible to indirect prompt injection because its core function is to ingest and process untrusted data from external web applications.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the system via the Katana crawler, which saves results to workspace/crawled_anonymous.jsonl, and through the multi-agent findings stored in workspace/findings/*.json.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; the skill directly processes crawler output to map attack surfaces.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has broad capabilities including file system writes (workspace/), network requests via httpx and requests, and browser automation via playwright.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or escaping of the content discovered by the crawler before it is passed to the specialized AI agents for vulnerability analysis.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 18, 2026, 05:07 PM