agent-browser-automation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill documentation includes examples using hardcoded credentials, specifically the command
agent-browser set credentials admin secret. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill provides tools for accessing and extracting sensitive information such as browser cookies (
agent-browser cookies), local storage (agent-browser storage), and system clipboard data (agent-browser clipboard read). It also facilitates saving session state to local files (agent-browser state save ./auth.json). - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
evalcommand allows for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript within the browser context, including support for Base64 encoded scripts via the-bflag. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from the web.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through commands like
snapshot,get text,get html, andconsolewhich retrieve content directly from external, potentially malicious web pages. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary markers or guidance for the agent to ignore embedded commands within the retrieved web content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses extensive capabilities that could be abused if an injection is successful, including file writes (
screenshot,pdf,state save), network operations (open,network route), and dynamic code execution (eval). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of the content retrieved from web pages before it is processed by the agent.
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