autoresearchclaw-autonomous-research
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructions require cloning a repository from an untrusted source (
https://github.com/aiming-lab/AutoResearchClaw.git) and installing it as an editable package. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The research pipeline includes stages for autonomous code generation (
Stage 10: CODE_GENERATION) and execution (Stage 12: EXPERIMENT_RUN). While the documentation mentions sandboxed execution, the process of running code generated by an LLM in response to untrusted data carries inherent security risks. - [PERSISTENCE]: The configuration for the 'OpenClaw bridge' includes a
use_cronparameter which, when enabled, allows the skill to schedule recurring research tasks on the host system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a vulnerability surface by ingesting literature from external sources like arXiv and Semantic Scholar to inform its autonomous code generation and experimentation phases.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context during the
LITERATURE_COLLECTandKNOWLEDGE_EXTRACTstages through API calls to external services. - Boundary markers: The documentation does not specify the use of delimiters or warnings to prevent the agent from following instructions embedded in the collected literature.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses capabilities to write files to the
deliverables/directory and execute Python code in a sandbox environment. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitizing or escaping the external content before it is processed by the multi-agent debate and code generation modules.
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