autoteam-chatgpt-rotation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches source code and configuration files from an external GitHub repository (
github.com/cnitlrt/AutoTeam) that is not part of the trusted vendor list. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves downloading a repository and immediately executing a shell script (
bash setup.sh), allowing for the execution of unverified remote code on the system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of CLI tools and subprocesses, including
uvfor environment management,playwrightfor browser automation, anddocker composefor service orchestration. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The primary function of the skill involves managing and synchronizing sensitive credentials, including
TEAM_ADMIN_PASSWORD,CPA_API_KEY, andCLOUDMAIL_API_KEY, which are stored in environment files and an SQLite database. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The browser automation logic in
src/autoteam/browser.pyreads and processes verification content from external temporary email services. - Boundary markers: No explicit boundary markers or isolation protocols are defined for handling the untrusted text from email bodies.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses significant capabilities, including full browser control, network exfiltration potential via
httpx, and filesystem write access for configuration and database files. - Sanitization: There is no documented evidence of sanitization or validation performed on data ingested from external mail APIs before it influences automation workflows.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata