baguette-ios-simulator
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires installing software from an unverified Homebrew tap (
tddworks/tap/baguette) and cloning source code from an external GitHub repository (github.com/tddworks/baguette). These sources are not affiliated with recognized trusted organizations. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions include cloning a third-party repository and running build commands (
make), which executes unverified code on the host machine. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The agent is directed to use CLI commands for system-level simulator management (
baguette boot,baguette shutdown) and package installation, which could be misused if commands are not carefully validated. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The tool processes JSON-based gesture commands from standard input and WebSockets. This creates a vulnerability where malicious data could be used to manipulate the simulator's UI.
- Ingestion points:
baguette inputcommand and the/simulators/:udid/streamWebSocket endpoint. - Boundary markers: No security boundaries or instructions to ignore embedded commands are documented for the JSON input stream.
- Capability inventory: Full HID event injection including multi-finger gestures and hardware button presses.
- Sanitization: Input is parsed for structure but not for malicious behavioral patterns.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill can stream the simulator's screen content over the network. Starting the server on all interfaces (
0.0.0.0) could allow unauthorized observers to capture sensitive visual information from the simulator. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: Troubleshooting steps suggest using
sudo xcode-select, which grants administrative access to modify system-wide developer settings.
Audit Metadata