cc-connect-ai-bridge
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPRIVILEGE_ESCALATIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to download and install pre-compiled binaries (
cc-connect-linux-amd64,cc-connect-darwin-arm64) from a personal GitHub repository (chenhg5/cc-connect) rather than a verified organization or official vendor repository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides a
/shell <cmd>command intended for administration, which allows for the remote execution of arbitrary shell commands on the host machine via messaging platforms like Telegram or Slack. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The 'Quick AI-assisted Setup' section includes a prompt directing the AI agent to fetch and follow instructions from a remote source (
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/chenhg5/cc-connect/refs/heads/main/INSTALL.md). This pattern can be exploited to trick the agent into executing arbitrary malicious code or commands at runtime. - [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The installation instructions require the use of
sudoto move unverified binaries into system-wide executable paths (/usr/local/bin/), which can grant the software elevated permissions. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill features a
/croncommand allowing for the scheduling of recurring tasks, which can be used to establish persistence by repeatedly executing shell commands or scripts at specified intervals. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The bridge architecture creates a significant attack surface for indirect prompt injection. Untrusted input from messaging platforms is passed directly to a local agent that has high-privilege capabilities such as shell access and file manipulation. While an
admin_fromcheck is mentioned, the lack of explicit instruction delimitation or sanitization before passing input to the agent increases the risk of command injection or malicious instruction execution. - Ingestion points: Messaging platform messages (Telegram, Slack, Discord, etc.) are ingested by the
cc-connectprocess and forwarded to the local AI agent. - Boundary markers: None explicitly documented for protecting the AI agent from untrusted platform input.
- Capability inventory: The skill provides
/shellcommand execution,/cronscheduling, and file system access via the connected agent's working directory. - Sanitization: The skill relies on a user ID check (
admin_from) but does not describe sanitization of the content sent to the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata