cc-gateway-ai-proxy
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to clone an external repository from
https://github.com/motiful/cc-gateway.gitthat is not managed by a verified or trusted organization. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Following the download, the instructions prompt the user to run
npm installand variousnpm runcommands, which executes code from the unverified external source. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill contains a script
scripts/extract-token.shspecifically designed to extract sensitive OAuth refresh tokens from the macOS Keychain. Furthermore, it directs users to manually copy and store these authentication secrets into a plain-textconfig.yamlfile and local environment variables. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple shell scripts, including
scripts/extract-token.shandscripts/client-setup.sh, which perform privileged or sensitive operations on the host system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The gateway architecture serves as an ingestion point for all LLM traffic, where the skill explicitly rewrites request bodies and prompt text (e.g., identity fields, environment objects, and home directory paths). This creates a vulnerability surface where crafted data from external sources could be processed by the gateway's logic without documented sanitization.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the gateway context through the
rewriteBodyfunction and API proxying logic mentioned inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified in the provided documentation or rewriter examples.
- Capability inventory: The gateway performs network operations, file system writes (
addClientToConfig), and identity spoofing. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or escaping for the fields being rewritten or the headers being injected.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata