claude-hud-statusline
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONMETADATA_POISONINGINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill directs the user to add a marketplace source and install a plugin from an external repository (
jarrodwatts/claude-hud) that has no established trust relationship with the environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation and setup process involves executing third-party code within the Claude Code environment via commands like
/plugin installand/claude-hud:setup. - [METADATA_POISONING]: There is a significant discrepancy between the declared author in the skill manifest, the claimed creator in the body text (
ara.so), and the actual installation source (jarrodwatts). This deceptive layering of identity can mislead users regarding the origin and safety of the software. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The plugin continuously monitors the
transcript JSONLfile, which stores real-time activity from all tools and subagents used in the session. - Boundary markers: The skill does not define any boundary markers or instructions to ignore malicious data embedded in tool outputs displayed by the statusline.
- Capability inventory: The plugin parses internal session logs and updates a terminal statusline every 300ms, giving it access to all data exchanged during the session.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence that the plugin sanitizes the transcript data before rendering it to the terminal.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The troubleshooting and requirement sections provide manual shell commands for setting up temporary directories and using system package managers (
winget) to install runtime dependencies.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata