flowdriver-covert-transport
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPERSISTENCEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to clone source code from an external, non-trusted GitHub repository (
https://github.com/NullLatency/FlowDriver.git). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: Following the download, the instructions guide the user to compile the source code using
go buildand execute the resulting binaries on both local and remote machines. - [PERSISTENCE]: The skill provides a systemd service configuration (
flowdriver.service) designed to maintain the application's execution state across system restarts, allowing it to run persistently in the background. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill establishes a significant ingestion surface for untrusted external data through its SOCKS5 proxy and Google Drive API integration.
- Ingestion points: Data entering the system via the local SOCKS5 listener and binary-encoded packets polled from the shared Google Drive folder.
- Boundary markers: None identified; there are no explicit delimiters or instructions to prevent the agent from interpreting tunneled data as commands.
- Capability inventory: The skill performs file system writes (storing OAuth tokens and updating JSON configs) and network operations (opening TCP connections to arbitrary internet destinations).
- Sanitization: The skill does not describe any validation or sanitization mechanisms for the binary protocol packets processed during the tunneling operation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata