gemma-gem-browser-ai
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
run_javascripttool implementation inbackground/tools.tsusesnew Function(args.code as string)to create an executable function from a string. This string is generated by the AI model during the agent loop. Executing AI-generated strings as code is a high-risk pattern that allows for arbitrary code execution within the browser context. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill architecture is susceptible to indirect prompt injection attacks where malicious web content could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: The
read_page_contenttool incontent/tools/executor.tsextracts raw text and HTML from active browser tabs and provides it to the AI model. - Boundary markers: The agent loop (
agent/loop.ts) and prompt construction do not show usage of structured boundary markers or explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested page data. - Capability inventory: The extension possesses powerful capabilities including
run_javascript(arbitrary code execution),take_screenshot(visual data capture), and DOM manipulation tools (click_element,type_text). - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or filtering of page content before it is passed to the Gemma 4 model.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads AI model weights from Hugging Face's official repositories (e.g.,
onnx-community/gemma-4-E2B-it-ONNX). These downloads are performed using the@huggingface/transformerslibrary. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The service worker utilizes
chrome.scripting.executeScriptto run code within the context of web pages. When combined with the AI-drivenrun_javascripttool, this allows the agent to perform complex, unvalidated actions on behalf of the user in any open tab.
Audit Metadata