gpt-image-2-skill
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The documentation encourages users to download and install tools from a specific GitHub repository hosted by an unverified user.
- Evidence:
uvx --from git+https://github.com/wuyoscar/gpt_image_2_skill gpt-image -p "a cat astronaut"inSKILL.md. - Evidence:
uv tool install git+https://github.com/wuyoscar/gpt_image_2_skillinSKILL.md. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions promote the use of
uvx, a tool that fetches and executes code from a remote source in a single step, bypassing manual review. - Evidence: The "Install" section of
SKILL.mdhighlightsuvxas the fastest way to run the CLI. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as an intermediary for user-provided data, creating a vector for instructions to be processed by the underlying AI model.
- Ingestion points: User prompts passed via CLI flags or Python arguments, and local image files used for editing.
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack recommendations for delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in input data.
- Capability inventory: The skill interacts with the OpenAI API over the network and performs local file read and write operations using the
openaiandpathliblibraries as seen in the Python SDK usage examples inSKILL.md. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the input prompt strings or image files is described in the skill documentation.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata