gsd-2-agent-framework

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to install a package globally using npm install -g gsd-pi. The package source is not recognized as a trusted organization or well-known service, posing a supply chain risk.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The framework's core functionality involve executing arbitrary shell commands specified within PLAN.md files (under the "Must-Haves" section) to verify task completion. While intended for development tasks, this provides a direct path for executing arbitrary commands on the host system.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The framework allows the loading and execution of custom TypeScript logic from a local file path (./hooks.ts) defined in a configuration file (.gsd/config.json). This dynamic loading of executable content at runtime is a high-risk pattern if the source file is compromised.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from multiple project files to direct the agent's behavior, creating an injection surface.
    • Ingestion points: Content is read from PROJECT.md, ROADMAP.md, PLAN.md, RESEARCH.md, and SKILLS.md and injected into the agent's prompts.
    • Boundary markers: The skill documentation notes that context is "pre-inlined" into dispatch prompts but does not specify the use of delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within these files.
    • Capability inventory: The agent framework possesses extensive capabilities, including full shell command execution, file system modification, git management, and network access.
    • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation performed on the markdown content before it is interpolated into the agent's execution context.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 12, 2026, 08:31 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gsd-2-agent-framework