gstack-workflow-assistant

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCEPRIVILEGE_ESCALATION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to clone source code from a personal GitHub repository (https://github.com/garrytan/gstack.git) rather than a trusted organization or official registry.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process requires executing a setup script (./setup) and a pre-compiled binary (browse/dist/browse) from the external repository, enabling unverified code execution on the host machine.
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The /setup-browser-cookies command is designed to extract and import sensitive session cookies from the user's local browser installations (Chrome, Arc, Brave, and Edge) into the assistant's workspace.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: By harvesting authenticated session cookies, the skill gains the ability to access private user accounts and sensitive data on external websites without manual login.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses shell commands for setup (bun install), automated release management (/ship), and repository analysis (/retro).
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The toolset provides a significant surface for indirect prompt injection by processing untrusted data from external URLs through the /browse and /qa commands. Ingestion points: Web content is ingested from user-provided or discovered URLs during browser automation and QA testing. Boundary markers: The skill defines no delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands in fetched web content. Capability inventory: The skill possesses file write access, network access, and the ability to execute git commands for branch management. Sanitization: No evidence of filtering or sanitization of retrieved web content is provided in the instructions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill includes a directive to "Never use mcp__claude-in-chrome__* tools," which attempts to override the agent's default tool selection and safety guardrails.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: The skill maintains presence by installing itself in the ~/.claude/skills/ directory, ensuring it is loaded across different agent sessions.
  • [PRIVILEGE_ESCALATION]: The installation instructions require the user to manually grant execution permissions (chmod +x) to downloaded scripts and binaries, escalating their privileges on the host system.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 12, 2026, 08:24 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — gstack-workflow-assistant