karpathytalk-community
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to download the source code of the KarpathyTalk application from a remote GitHub repository (
https://github.com/karpathy/KarpathyTalk.git) usinggit clone. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill requires the user to compile and execute a binary (
go build -o karpathytalk ./cmd/karpathytalkand./karpathytalk) from the downloaded source code. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides patterns and code samples for building LLM agents that ingest untrusted user-generated content from the social network API.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via
http.Getcalls to/api/posts,/api/posts.md, and/api/users/{username}/posts.mdin the provided Go samples (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions or code for using delimiters or boundary markers when interpolating this external content into LLM prompts.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment includes network access (
http.Get), database access (sqlite3), and the ability to build and run Go binaries. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization, validation, or filtering of the fetched markdown/JSON content before it is injected into the prompt context in the
getContextForLLMexample.
Audit Metadata