opengame-agentic-game-creation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the agent to clone a software repository from an untrusted source:
https://github.com/leigest519/OpenGame.git. This repository is not associated with a known trusted organization or service. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process requires running
npm installand subsequentnpm runcommands on the cloned repository. Since the repository content is unverifiable, this constitutes the execution of untrusted code on the host system. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The framework generates web game code (HTML, JavaScript, and CSS) dynamically from natural language prompts and executes it using a headless browser (Chromium via Playwright) for automated evaluation. Running dynamically generated code, especially code that interacts with a browser environment, presents a significant security risk if the generation process is compromised.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The framework is designed to ingest natural language prompts to drive the agentic code generation and evaluation process. This creates a vulnerability surface where a malicious prompt could inject instructions that influence the generated code's behavior or the evaluation pipeline.
- Ingestion points: User-provided game design prompts passed to the
generatecommand. - Boundary markers: None explicitly documented in the skill instructions to separate prompt instructions from the execution context.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to write files to the local disk, execute shell commands via npm, and perform network requests to LLM and VLM endpoints.
- Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or safety filtering for the generated web code before it is executed in the headless browser.
Audit Metadata