picoclaw-ai-assistant

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download executable files from a third-party source at github.com/sipeed/picoclaw using wget.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions guide the agent to grant execution permissions (chmod +x) and run the downloaded binary (./picoclaw-linux-arm64 onboard), which allows for the execution of arbitrary external code.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup process relies on several shell commands, including wget, chmod, git, and make, which are used to fetch and prepare the execution environment.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill allows the agent to ingest untrusted data from the web (via Brave and Tavily) and from a local workspace folder, which could be exploited to manipulate agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Web search results and files within the ~/.picoclaw/workspace directory.
  • Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions or configuration.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can perform network requests and has read/write access to a local workspace.
  • Sanitization: No data validation or sanitization procedures are described for external tool outputs.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 12, 2026, 08:37 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — picoclaw-ai-assistant