picoclaw-ai-assistant
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill provides instructions to download executable files from a third-party source at
github.com/sipeed/picoclawusingwget. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions guide the agent to grant execution permissions (
chmod +x) and run the downloaded binary (./picoclaw-linux-arm64 onboard), which allows for the execution of arbitrary external code. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The setup process relies on several shell commands, including
wget,chmod,git, andmake, which are used to fetch and prepare the execution environment. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill allows the agent to ingest untrusted data from the web (via Brave and Tavily) and from a local workspace folder, which could be exploited to manipulate agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Web search results and files within the
~/.picoclaw/workspacedirectory. - Boundary markers: None identified in the instructions or configuration.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform network requests and has read/write access to a local workspace.
- Sanitization: No data validation or sanitization procedures are described for external tool outputs.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata