stash-ai-memory
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to clone source code from an external repository located at
https://github.com/alash3al/stash.git. This repository is not associated with a known trusted vendor. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves downloading external code and executing it via
docker compose uporgo build, which facilitates the execution of remote code on the local system. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several administrative and build commands are required for setup and maintenance, including
docker exec,go build, andcurlfor triggering consolidation pipelines or setting context. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a memory layer that ingests potentially untrusted data and re-injects it into the LLM's system prompt or context.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the system via the
stash_rememberMCP tool and the/api/episodesHTTP endpoint as defined inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define or implement boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within recalled memories.
- Capability inventory: The skill manages persistent storage, performs semantic searches, and interacts with external LLM providers, providing a mechanism to persist and re-trigger instructions across sessions.
- Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, filtering, or validation mechanisms for the content stored in the memory layer before it is presented back to the AI agent.
Audit Metadata