stash-ai-memory

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 12, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs users to clone source code from an external repository located at https://github.com/alash3al/stash.git. This repository is not associated with a known trusted vendor.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The installation process involves downloading external code and executing it via docker compose up or go build, which facilitates the execution of remote code on the local system.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Several administrative and build commands are required for setup and maintenance, including docker exec, go build, and curl for triggering consolidation pipelines or setting context.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as a memory layer that ingests potentially untrusted data and re-injects it into the LLM's system prompt or context.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the system via the stash_remember MCP tool and the /api/episodes HTTP endpoint as defined in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not define or implement boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within recalled memories.
  • Capability inventory: The skill manages persistent storage, performs semantic searches, and interacts with external LLM providers, providing a mechanism to persist and re-trigger instructions across sessions.
  • Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization, filtering, or validation mechanisms for the content stored in the memory layer before it is presented back to the AI agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 12, 2026, 11:44 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — stash-ai-memory