turboquant-pytorch

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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to clone executable code from an external GitHub repository (github.com/tonbistudio/turboquant-pytorch).\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the user to execute the downloaded code via shell commands such as python -m turboquant.test_turboquant and python -m turboquant.validate.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The troubleshooting section recommends using the pickle module to save and load codebooks. The pickle module is insecure and can be exploited to execute arbitrary code if it loads a maliciously crafted file.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches pre-trained models (e.g., Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) from the Hugging Face hub during validation.\n
  • Ingestion points: External model files are downloaded and processed by validation scripts.\n
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content are present in the model loading process.\n
  • Capability inventory: The skill environment allows command execution (git, pip, python), file system writes for caching, and unsafe file loading via pickle.\n
  • Sanitization: There are no integrity checks or sanitization routines mentioned for the downloaded model data or the serialized codebook files.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 14, 2026, 10:37 AM