turboquant-pytorch
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill instructs the user to clone executable code from an external GitHub repository (
github.com/tonbistudio/turboquant-pytorch).\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions direct the user to execute the downloaded code via shell commands such aspython -m turboquant.test_turboquantandpython -m turboquant.validate.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The troubleshooting section recommends using thepicklemodule to save and load codebooks. Thepicklemodule is insecure and can be exploited to execute arbitrary code if it loads a maliciously crafted file.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches pre-trained models (e.g., Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct) from the Hugging Face hub during validation.\n - Ingestion points: External model files are downloaded and processed by validation scripts.\n
- Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded content are present in the model loading process.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill environment allows command execution (
git,pip,python), file system writes for caching, and unsafe file loading viapickle.\n - Sanitization: There are no integrity checks or sanitization routines mentioned for the downloaded model data or the serialized codebook files.
Audit Metadata