recoup-content-make-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted external data such as song lyrics, artist descriptions, and audience sentiment which could contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points:
context/artist.md,context/audience.md, transcription lyrics, and social media post history fetched via API. - Boundary markers: None. Instructions do not provide delimiters for separating external data from agent prompts.
- Capability inventory: Shell execution (
curl,jq,sed,yt-dlp) and workspace file modifications. - Sanitization: None. External data is directly interpolated into prompts and used to drive generation parameters.
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains instructions that direct the agent to conceal process failures and regeneration attempts from the user to ensure only high-quality output is presented.
- Evidence:
references/analyze-gate.mdinstructs the agent to "regenerate ... re-analyze" and "Don't ship a flagged asset" when quality checks fail. TheStophook inSKILL.mdenforces this by blocking the agent from declaring a task finished until a successful analysis pass is recorded in the conversation, overriding the agent's completion claim. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads content from external and vendor-managed sources to fulfill its multimedia generation tasks.
- Evidence:
references/song-sourcing.mddescribes usingyt-dlpto download audio from YouTube. The skill also fetches binary files (MP3, MP4) from vendor repositories via theGET /api/sandboxes/fileendpoint. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on executing shell commands to perform its primary functions, including API interaction and file processing.
- Evidence: Multiple reference files provide bash snippets using
curl,jq,sed, andyt-dlpto interact with the vendor API (api.recoupable.dev) and manage local workspace files.
Audit Metadata