recoup-internal-consulting-content-distribution
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes multiple local Python scripts located in the
integrations/linkedin/_work/directory to perform LinkedIn publishing, post discovery, engagement monitoring, and lead enrichment. - Evidence:
publish.py,pull_posts.py,pull_engagement.py,enrich.py,crossref_attio.py, andmake_loop.py. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from an external social media platform (LinkedIn) to monitor engagement and identify lead candidates, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: LinkedIn posts and engagement data (likes, comments, shares) are fetched via
pull_posts.pyandpull_engagement.py(Step 4 and 5) and processed in SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define specific delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the fetched social media content.
- Capability inventory: The skill coordinates subprocess calls to Python scripts for publishing and enrichment, and has the ability to write state to
distribution.md,linkedin.md, and theemail/outbox/directory. - Sanitization: Absent. There is no mention of sanitization, validation, or filtering for the external content before it is processed by enrichment scripts or used by the agent to determine lead candidates.
Audit Metadata