bili-ai-feed

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The configuration file references/investigator-config.json contains a hardcoded default API key (ak_b45b6a6881f4400fb321428947eb6661) for accessing the vendor's services.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script assets/daily_report.py executes shell commands to establish persistence, using launchctl on macOS and modifying the user's crontab on Linux/Windows systems.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The main script utilizes subprocess.run with shell=True when managing crontab entries, which can be sensitive to command injection if paths or inputs are improperly handled.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The script reads sensitive local environment configuration files, such as ~/.zshrc and ~/.bashrc, to extract API keys for authentication.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches dynamic video metadata from the vendor's API endpoint at https://redfox.hk/story/api/parseWork/queryBiliAiMsgs.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Indirect Prompt Injection Surface:
  • Ingestion points: External video titles and tags are fetched from the Bilibili API and processed in assets/daily_report.py.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; external data is integrated into the analysis flow without specific delimiters or isolation instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill performs subprocess execution and file system operations.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or escaping untrusted external text (titles/tags) before it is analyzed by the agent, potentially allowing embedded instructions to influence agent behavior.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 16, 2026, 08:45 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — bili-ai-feed