cultural-tourism-wechat-feed
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 29, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The
scripts/cultural_tourism_report.pyfile contains aninstall_subscriptionfunction that enables persistent execution of the skill. On macOS, it creates a LaunchAgent at~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.qoder.cultural-tourism-wechat-feed.plist. On Linux systems, it modifies the user's crontab to schedule daily execution. While declared as a feature, these mechanisms represent persistent system modifications.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill is vulnerable to shell command injection. In theinstall_subscriptionfunction withinscripts/cultural_tourism_report.py, thekeywordargument (extracted from user input) is interpolated directly into a shell command string used insubprocess.run(shell=True)when updating the Linux crontab. An attacker providing a malicious keyword could execute arbitrary commands with the user's privileges.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses therequestslibrary to fetch data fromhttps://redfox.hk/story/api/parseWork/queryGzhPlayletMsgs. This is a vendor-controlled domain associated with the skill's author (redfox-data).\n- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: Authentication is managed via aREDFOX_API_KEY, which the skill expects to find in environment variables or a local configuration file at~/.qoder/apis/redfox.json. The documentation provides instructions for users to manually supply and store this credential.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes article data (titles, authors, and metadata) from an external API and presents it back to the agent for terminal output and JSON summarization. This ingestion of untrusted external content without strict boundary markers for the AI's processing creates a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata