douyin-rise-ranking
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPROMPT_INJECTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The instructions in
references/core_workflow.mdcontain explicit directives to override the AI agent's default behavior and constraints. The text states that the skill's formatting requirements have "highest priority" and must be 100% followed even if they conflict with the agent's internal rules or constraints (e.g., "highest priority, covering all default behaviors", "forbidden to skip template requirements for any default rule"). - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
scripts/gzh_growth_fetcher.pyaccesses sensitive local file paths. Specifically, the_get_api_keyfunction attempts to open and read user shell configuration files including~/.zshrc,~/.bashrc,~/.bash_profile, and~/.profileusing regular expressions to extract API keys. Accessing these files is a security risk as they may contain other sensitive environment variables or credentials. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's core functionality relies on executing a local Python script (
scripts/gzh_growth_fetcher.py) via the shell to fetch and process data from the RedFox API. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from an external API and displays it to the user.
- Ingestion points: The skill retrieves account nicknames and links from the
redfox.hkAPI endpoint inscripts/gzh_growth_fetcher.py. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings are used when interpolating the API data into the output templates defined in
references/core_workflow.md. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the ability to execute local scripts and perform network operations.
- Sanitization: The skill does not perform any validation or escaping of the nicknames or links returned by the API before including them in the final markdown output.
Audit Metadata