tiktok-keyword-topic-search
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The scripts
scripts/fetch_topic_aweme_list.pyandscripts/search_tiktok_topics.pyare designed to read from sensitive shell configuration files, specifically~/.zshrc,~/.bashrc,~/.bash_profile, and~/.profile. While the intent is to find theREDFOX_API_KEY, these files often contain other sensitive credentials, API keys, and private configuration data that should not be broadly accessed by individual skills. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: Both scripts implement a custom network requester,
post_redfox_no_sni, which explicitly disables SSL hostname verification by settingcontext.check_hostname = False. This bypasses a fundamental security mechanism of HTTPS, making the connection to theredfox.hkAPI vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks where an attacker could intercept or modify data in transit. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content retrieved from external TikTok topic and work lists, which presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Data is fetched from the
topicListandworkListfields via the RedFox API and displayed to the user. - Boundary markers: The skill uses Markdown tables to present the data, which provides some structural separation but does not prevent command injection if the LLM interprets the table content as instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses network access (via raw
socketandsslmodules) and file-read capabilities (accessing shell profiles). - Sanitization: The scripts include an
escape_mdfunction that escapes pipe characters and removes newlines to prevent simple Markdown table breakage, though this is not a comprehensive defense against LLM-based prompt injection.
Audit Metadata