tiktok-keyword-topic-search

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The scripts scripts/fetch_topic_aweme_list.py and scripts/search_tiktok_topics.py are designed to read from sensitive shell configuration files, specifically ~/.zshrc, ~/.bashrc, ~/.bash_profile, and ~/.profile. While the intent is to find the REDFOX_API_KEY, these files often contain other sensitive credentials, API keys, and private configuration data that should not be broadly accessed by individual skills.
  • [DATA_EXPOSURE]: Both scripts implement a custom network requester, post_redfox_no_sni, which explicitly disables SSL hostname verification by setting context.check_hostname = False. This bypasses a fundamental security mechanism of HTTPS, making the connection to the redfox.hk API vulnerable to Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) attacks where an attacker could intercept or modify data in transit.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content retrieved from external TikTok topic and work lists, which presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Data is fetched from the topicList and workList fields via the RedFox API and displayed to the user.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses Markdown tables to present the data, which provides some structural separation but does not prevent command injection if the LLM interprets the table content as instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses network access (via raw socket and ssl modules) and file-read capabilities (accessing shell profiles).
  • Sanitization: The scripts include an escape_md function that escapes pipe characters and removes newlines to prevent simple Markdown table breakage, though this is not a comprehensive defense against LLM-based prompt injection.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Oct 13, 2026, 02:09 AM