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Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 7, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
gh(GitHub) CLI to fetch pull request data, comment on PRs, and manage repository state. This is the primary mechanism for the skill's functionality. The Python scriptsanalyze-pr.pyandtriage-prs.pyexecute these commands usingsubprocess.runwith list-based arguments, which is a secure practice to prevent shell injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: In
workflows/onboard-plugin.md, the skill performs acurloperation to fetchbackstage.jsonfrom upstream plugin repositories to verify version compatibility. This involves downloading data from external sources, but the content is piped directly tojqfor parsing rather than being executed as code. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an indirect prompt injection surface as it ingests untrusted data from GitHub pull requests (titles, bodies, and file paths) to generate reports and determine triage priority.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/analyze-pr.pyandscripts/triage-prs.pyfetch PR metadata via thegh pr viewandgh pr listcommands. - Boundary markers: Absent. There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the model to ignore potential commands embedded in the PR text.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute
ghcommands (including commenting on PRs), perform local file operations, and managepodmancontainers via therhdh-localenvironment. - Sanitization: The Python scripts utilize JSON parsing for structured data extraction. However, the workflows suggest a pattern of interpolating extracted workspace names into shell commands (e.g.,
grep "$WORKSPACE"). While the risk is low due to the use of quotes and the specialized nature of the skill, it remains a known surface.
Audit Metadata