ask-rhdh
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill aggregates descriptions from all skills listed in the catalog to build its routing table, creating a vector for cross-skill instruction injection.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/render_routes.pyscript reads thecatalog.jsonfile and then opens everySKILL.mdfile referenced in the catalog to extract thedescriptionfield from its YAML frontmatter. - Boundary markers: The extracted descriptions are placed directly into a Markdown table in
SKILL.md. There are no specific delimiters or instructions to the agent to disregard any embedded commands within those descriptions. - Capability inventory: The skill itself contains instructions to invoke other specialized skills based on the user's request. The maintenance script
scripts/render_routes.pyhas the capability to overwrite the skill's ownSKILL.mdfile when the--writeflag is used. - Sanitization: The Python script performs basic character escaping for the pipe symbol (
|) to ensure the Markdown table structure remains intact, but it does not filter or sanitize the content for potential prompt injection or natural language instructions. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a maintenance script
scripts/render_routes.pythat is intended to be executed in the development environment to sync the routing table. - Evidence: The script uses
argparseto handle command-line arguments like--writeand--check, and it usespathlibto perform file system operations (reading catalog and skill files, and writing toSKILL.md). This is standard repository maintenance behavior and not inherently malicious, but it represents the execution surface associated with the skill.
Audit Metadata