raise-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 29, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection by ingesting untrusted data from external issues and interpolating it into instructions without sanitization.\n
- Ingestion points: Fetches Jira issue summaries via the Jira REST API and GitHub issue titles via the
ghCLI (Step 1.5, Step 11).\n - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill embeds external metadata directly into pull request body templates and git commit messages.\n
- Capability inventory: Extensive subprocess execution (
git,yarn,gh,curl,acli) and file system access.\n - Sanitization: No filtering or escaping is applied to the external issue metadata before interpolation.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive shell command execution for its core functionality, including git repository management and build processes with yarn. It also uses
python3 -cto execute inline utility scripts for parsing JSON responses from network APIs (Step 10.2, Step 11).\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow involves fetching dependencies viayarnand communicating with well-known services (GitHub, Atlassian/Jira) to manage development tasks, following documented authentication best practices for these platforms.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill processes data fetched from official GitHub and Jira API endpoints using inline Python scripts for JSON parsing. These utility operations target well-known services.
Audit Metadata