rhdh-coding
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 21, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill recommends downloading and installing several extensions from untrusted GitHub repositories in
references/ecosystem-skills.md. - Instructions include
npx skills addcommands for repositories owned by individual users:nextlevelbuilder/ui-ux-pro-max-skill,leonxlnx/taste-skill, andemilkowalski/skills. - The skill also references official and trusted sources, including
backstage.ioand theanthropics/skillsrepository. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill guides the agent to execute shell commands to analyze the environment and manage the build lifecycle.
- Executes a bundled script:
python scripts/detect-rhdh-context.py --path <plugin-dir>which performs file system analysis. - Reads workspace-specific instruction files using
cat AGENTS.mdandcat CLAUDE.md. - Utilizes standard toolchains for development including
yarn build,yarn test, andyarn tsc. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by reading data from the local project environment.
- Ingestion points: The script
detect-rhdh-context.pyrecursively reads content from all.tsand.tsxfiles within thesrc/directory of the target project. Additionally, the skill explicitly readsAGENTS.mdandCLAUDE.mdfrom the workspace root. - Boundary markers: No delimiters or explicit instructions to ignore embedded instructions are used when reading these files into the agent context.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the capability to execute shell commands (via
pythonandyarn), perform Git operations, and write to the filesystem (e.g., generating API reports and changesets). - Sanitization: No sanitization, filtering, or escaping is performed on the content of the ingested files before they are interpreted by the agent.
Audit Metadata