rhdh-forge
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes the GitHub (
gh) and GitLab (glab) command-line interfaces to retrieve repository metadata, issue details, and pull request statuses. The implementation inscripts/fetch_issue_context.pyusessubprocess.runwith argument lists rather than shell strings, which prevents shell injection vulnerabilities. These operations are restricted to read-only queries by design. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted content from external forge platforms (titles, descriptions, and comments). This creates a potential surface for indirect prompt injection where an attacker could place malicious instructions inside a GitHub issue. However, the skill implements strong structural mitigations:
- Mutation Boundary: It strictly separates reading from writing; all destructive actions (like comments or PR creation) are returned as text payloads for human review instead of being executed by the agent.
- Safe Interpolation: Instructions explicitly forbid the agent from using
evalor interpolating untrusted text directly into shell commands, requiring the use of body files and proper argument quoting. - Input Validation: Repository names and issue numbers are parsed and validated using strict regular expressions before being passed to CLI tools.
Audit Metadata