rhdh-jira-api
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes several Python scripts to interface with the Atlassian CLI (
acli). Scripts such assetup.py,parse_issues.py,validate_components.py, andvalidate_field_ids.pyusesubprocess.runto execute commands. These executions use list-based arguments, which is a secure practice that avoids shell interpretation and mitigates command injection risks. The scripts search for theacliexecutable in standard system paths and user-local directories. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes Jira issue data, including summaries and descriptions, which may be authored by third parties. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where instructions embedded in Jira content could influence the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Scripts such as
parse_issues.pyandadf_milestones.pyingest JSON data from Jira and process text from fields like 'summary' and 'description'. - Boundary markers: The skill documentation provides clear guidance on the intended read-only scope, but the underlying scripts do not use specific delimiters or markers to isolate untrusted text.
- Capability inventory: The skill is capable of performing bulk searches and viewing detailed issue data using
acli. It does not perform writes or network operations outside of the authenticated CLI tool. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering is performed on the text content extracted from Jira issues before it is presented to the agent.
Audit Metadata