rhdh-jira-link
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 2, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill manages Jira API credentials, reading them from environment variables (
JIRA_API_TOKEN) or local configuration files (~/.config/.jira/.config.yml,.jira-token). This behavior is standard for the skill's documented purpose of interacting with the Jira API. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The scripts execute several local command-line utilities including
git,gh(GitHub CLI), andglab(GitLab CLI) to manage repositories and PR/MR creation. These operations are performed usingspawnSyncwith argument arrays, which is a secure method to prevent shell injection. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill makes network requests to Jira API endpoints (
atlassian.net) and GitLab/GitHub instances to fetch issue details and manage remote links. These interactions are necessary for the skill's primary functionality. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it processes untrusted data such as PR titles and Jira issue summaries.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the agent context through the
--titleand--bodyarguments increate-pr-mr.jsand via Jira issue fields fetched inlink-pr-mr.js(scripts/create-pr-mr.js, scripts/link-pr-mr.js). - Boundary markers: The documentation recommends using
/prose-editingfor input processing, but no explicit programmatic delimiters are enforced within the scripts themselves. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands (
git,gh,glab) and perform network operations viafetch(Jira API). - Sanitization: Shell injection is mitigated by using argument arrays in
spawnSync, though the semantic content of the inputs is not validated for malicious instructions.
Audit Metadata