rhdh-jira-sprint-report
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes work item summaries, labels, and epic data from Jira which is controlled by external users. This data is ingested into the agent's context and could contain instructions designed to manipulate the agent's output or actions.
- Ingestion points: Work item details fetched via
acli jira workitem searchinworkflows/summarize-sprint.md(Step 2). - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings to the model to ignore embedded instructions within the ticket data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has the ability to execute shell commands (
acli) and write files to the local system. - Sanitization: There is no process described for sanitizing or escaping the content of Jira issues before reporting.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill workflow directs the agent to execute shell commands using the
aclitool, with arguments constructed from user-supplied inputs such as Team ID and Board ID. - Evidence: Shell commands in
workflows/summarize-sprint.md(Steps 1, 2, and 8) use placeholders likeBOARD_IDandSPRINT_IDwhich are populated from user input. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates a local markdown file based on a naming template that includes user-provided variables.
- Evidence:
Step 9inworkflows/summarize-sprint.mdinstructs the agent to write a file namedsprint-report-{team}-{sprint}-{YYYY-MM-DD}.mdto the current directory, which could lead to path traversal if theteamorsprintvariables contain directory manipulation characters.
Audit Metadata