rhdh-prow-trigger
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
subprocess.runfunction to interact with theoccommand-line tool. This is used to verify the user's session status and to retrieve transient authentication tokens viaoc whoami -t. The implementation follows security best practices by passing arguments as a list and avoiding the use of a shell for execution. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The script fetches job metadata and container image tags from
prow.ci.openshift.organdquay.io. These operations are performed to assist the user in selecting the correct job parameters and are limited to official Red Hat/OpenShift infrastructure. - [DATA_EXPOSURE]: Accesses the OpenShift CI configuration file at
~/.config/openshift-ci/kubeconfigto authenticate API requests. The scripts are designed to handle credentials securely in memory, ensuring that tokens are not leaked into terminal output or logs. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes data from external web sources, creating a potential surface for indirect injection.
- Ingestion points: Fetches and parses data from
prow.ci.openshift.organdquay.io. - Boundary markers: The workflow structures this information into markdown tables for the agent's context.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform authenticated POST requests to trigger CI jobs and execute
occommands. - Sanitization: The script uses specific regular expressions to validate job names and version tags before they are displayed or used.
Audit Metadata