rhdh-release-teams
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of
subprocess.runto invoke theacli(Atlassian CLI),gog(Google Workspace CLI), andgitcommands. These are used to fetch Jira issue data, Google Sheet contents, and repository configuration. - Evidence in
scripts/release.py,scripts/_jira.py, andscripts/rich_filter.pyshows commands likeacli jira workitem searchandgog sheets getbeing executed with arguments derived from skill logic. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from Jira issue descriptions, summaries, and Google Sheets to generate reports and Slack messages.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/release.pyfetches data from Google Sheets (TEAM_SHEET_ID,SCHEDULE_SHEET_ID) and Jira issues viaacli. - Boundary markers: The skill uses triple-backtick blocks (e.g., ```slack) to delimit generated output, but lacks explicit instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read from the network (via CLI tools) and write to the terminal/agent context. It does not perform direct file writes or arbitrary system modifications.
- Sanitization: The script
_adf_to_textinscripts/_jira.pyflattens Atlassian Document Format (ADF) into plain text, which removes some formatting but does not filter for malicious prompt instructions embedded in issue descriptions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on external CLI tools (
acli,gog,uv) and fetches data from remote APIs (issues.redhat.com,docs.google.com). These are well-known services consistent with the developer workflow of the 'redhat-developer' vendor.
Audit Metadata