add-agent-playbooks
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill integrates external content (FAQs and Skills) into the agent's prompt, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection if the content source is compromised.\n
- Ingestion points: Content is ingested from local files in
faqs/andskills/directories and retrieved at runtime from the Redis Iris service via theredis-irisSDK.\n - Boundary markers: The skill suggests rebuilding context from the base prompt each turn to prevent instruction leakage between turns, though it does not mandate specific delimiters for the injected content.\n
- Capability inventory: The agent is granted capabilities to discover playbooks and load procedural instructions using registered tools (
load_skill,discover_playbook).\n - Sanitization: Security relies on a 'content authoring' workflow where content is validated, planned, and published by a human or trusted CI process before being served to the agent.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for using the
irisCLI tool to manage agent playbooks, including provisioning services, managing keys, and synchronizing content.\n - Evidence: Multiple
iris agent-playbookscommands are documented for administration, extraction binding, and content publication.\n - Context: These are standard administrative operations for the Redis Iris platform and include safety flags like
--json --no-inputand--dry-run.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses dynamic instruction loading where the agent identifies and loads 'Skills' (procedures) at runtime based on the conversation context.\n - Mechanism: The
load_skilltool allows the agent to fetch specific procedural instructions that are not part of the initial system prompt.\n - Evidence: Documentation in
references/integration.mddescribes tool registration for progressive disclosure and score-based hooks.
Audit Metadata