extract-structure
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and interpret data from
_base.json(exported from a Figma plugin) andoptionalContext(provided by a user). This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions embedded in the design metadata or user context could influence the agent's interpretation or execution logic. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdspecifies reading external content from{cachePath}/{componentSlug}-_base.jsonand consumingoptionalContextas authoritative guidance. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not define strict boundary markers or delimiting protocols to separate user data from the agent's core instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to write JSON files to the local disk and execute scripts via the
figma_executeanduse_figmatools. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization, filtering, or validation rules for the ingested external data are described.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses an 'escape hatch' (Step 3-delta) that allows the agent to generate and execute small JavaScript snippets at runtime to query the Figma API. While limited to 50 lines and read-only operations, this pattern involves dynamic code generation based on current task state.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes external tools (
figma_execute,use_figma) to run arbitrary JavaScript code within the Figma context for measurement purposes.
Audit Metadata