download-bilibili-video
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local browser directories to retrieve authentication cookies.
- The
detect_browser_profilefunction inscripts/download_bilibili.pysearches for profile roots in~/.config/chromium,~/.config/google-chrome, and~/snap/chromium/common/chromium. - These profiles are used to facilitate authenticated requests to Bilibili, which involves reading local browser data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external command-line tools to perform its primary tasks.
- It uses
subprocess.runto callyt-dlpwith a list of arguments including user-provided URLs and dynamically generated file paths. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with external domains to retrieve media and metadata.
- It performs network requests to
b23.tvandbilibili.com(both well-known services) to resolve short links and download video artifacts. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection via untrusted metadata from the media platform.
- Ingestion points: External video titles, descriptions, and metadata sidecars are downloaded via
yt-dlpfrom Bilibili. - Boundary markers: Absent; the content is saved directly to files like
.info.jsonand.txtwithout markers or warnings. - Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands via
subprocess.run. - Sanitization: None; the external strings are processed and stored without filtering for malicious instructions.
Audit Metadata