download-bilibili-video

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses sensitive local browser directories to retrieve authentication cookies.
  • The detect_browser_profile function in scripts/download_bilibili.py searches for profile roots in ~/.config/chromium, ~/.config/google-chrome, and ~/snap/chromium/common/chromium.
  • These profiles are used to facilitate authenticated requests to Bilibili, which involves reading local browser data.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes external command-line tools to perform its primary tasks.
  • It uses subprocess.run to call yt-dlp with a list of arguments including user-provided URLs and dynamically generated file paths.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill communicates with external domains to retrieve media and metadata.
  • It performs network requests to b23.tv and bilibili.com (both well-known services) to resolve short links and download video artifacts.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection via untrusted metadata from the media platform.
  • Ingestion points: External video titles, descriptions, and metadata sidecars are downloaded via yt-dlp from Bilibili.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the content is saved directly to files like .info.json and .txt without markers or warnings.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to execute shell commands via subprocess.run.
  • Sanitization: None; the external strings are processed and stored without filtering for malicious instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 22, 2026, 02:17 AM