wan-video
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests user-provided text descriptions (
text_prompt) and file metadata which are processed by the AI video model. This represents a surface for indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions could be embedded in the input data. - Ingestion points:
SKILL.mdidentifiestext_prompt,input_image, andinput_videoas inputs. - Boundary markers: Absent; inputs are interpolated into JSON payloads without explicit delimiters or safety instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell execution, network operations via the
reflyCLI (upload/run/download), and file system access to the user's Desktop. - Sanitization: No sanitization logic is present to filter or escape the input content before execution.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The execution steps involve shell scripting that uses variables derived from tool outputs (e.g.,
$FILE_NAME). If the external service returns a malicious filename (e.g., containing path traversal characters or shell metacharacters), the download andopencommands could execute unintended actions or overwrite files. - Evidence:
refly file download "$FILE_ID" -o "$HOME/Desktop/${FILE_NAME}"inSKILL.md.
Audit Metadata