shadcn-vite-iconify-landing-page
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Multiple utility scripts execute shell commands via
subprocess.run(Python) or directly in Bash to perform git operations, run linters, and capture debug information. - Evidence:
codex-sandbox/scripts/codex_sandbox.py,gh-repo-bootstrap/scripts/gh_repo_bootstrap.py,debug-lldb/scripts/collect_stacks.sh,pr-commiter/scripts/pr-commiter.sh. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Skills fetch project templates, gitignore patterns, and license files from external repositories and the GitHub API.
- Evidence:
create-new-static-websiteusesnpx gitpickfor theinstructa/astro-website-starterrepo. - Evidence:
gh-repo-bootstrapfetches templates via thegh api. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: Several skills have a surface for indirect prompt injection because they process untrusted data from the user's repository (such as documentation, ADRs, source code, and logs) to inform their actions.
- Ingestion points:
architecture-ownership,find-duplicate-ownership, androot-cause-finderread repository documentation and code files. - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands are used when reading external content.
- Capability inventory: The skills can perform git commits, write files, and attach to live processes (
lldb/gdb). - Sanitization: Input validation exists for user-provided parameters (e.g., repo names), but no specific sanitization is applied to content read from the file system.
Audit Metadata