roof-rfp-extract
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external RFP and tender document PDFs, making it susceptible to indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: Content is extracted directly from user-provided roof project documents in SKILL.md.
- Boundary markers: The instructions lack requirements for the agent to use delimiters (like XML tags) or specific instructions to ignore malicious commands embedded within the document text.
- Capability inventory: The skill's output is written to the local file system at
<rfp-dir>/roof-review-output/manifests/rfp.json, which is then consumed by downstream scripts likescripts/gate_applicability.py. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content validation, escaping, or filtering for the extracted strings before they are written to the output manifest.
Audit Metadata