goal-distill

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes a shell command on macOS (pbcopy) to copy the generated goal prompt to the system clipboard. The instruction specifies a shell pipe using a template (printf '%s' "<prompt-contents>" | pbcopy) that could lead to command injection if the distilled content contains shell metacharacters (such as backticks or subshells) and is not properly escaped by the agent during execution.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructs the agent to generate a prompt for a future session that includes an autonomous loop. This loop explicitly includes a "No human approval" directive for the planning phase, which encourages the bypass of user confirmation for subagent actions.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill has an indirect prompt injection surface as it is designed to ingest and summarize untrusted data from the repository and conversation history.
  • Ingestion points: Conversation history (including potential attacker-controlled inputs if following a PR or external log), repository state (git status, configs, diffs), and local documentation files (README, ADRs, CHANGELOG).
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not define delimiters or provide instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in the files it reads.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can read arbitrary files in the repository, view git history, and execute shell commands via pbcopy.
  • Sanitization: Absent. The skill does not specify any validation or sanitization of the content before it is processed and included in the final output prompt.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
May 16, 2026, 03:36 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — goal-distill