composio-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill documents the use of
composio run, which allows for the execution of arbitrary JavaScript and TypeScript snippets. This provides a powerful execution environment for the agent to chain tools and process data. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The documentation for
composio runandexperimental_subAgent()demonstrates interpolating untrusted data (e.g., email content fromGMAIL_FETCH_EMAILS) directly into LLM prompts usingresults.prompt(). This creates a vulnerability surface where malicious content in external data could influence the agent's behavior. - Ingestion points: Data from tool executions like
GMAIL_FETCH_EMAILS,search()results, andproxy()calls (found inSKILL.md,references/power-user-examples.md). - Boundary markers: None used in the examples; strings are directly concatenated or interpolated.
- Capability inventory: Access to
execute,search,link,proxy, and file upload capabilities (found inSKILL.md,references/composio-dev.md). - Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the interpolated data is described or implemented in the examples.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates extensive interaction with the local system via the
composioCLI, including account linking, file uploads (--file), and raw API proxying, which can be used to modify state or access sensitive external resources.
Audit Metadata