remotion-best-practices

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute various shell commands using npx, npm, yarn, pnpm, and bun to scaffold projects, install dependencies, and perform video rendering tasks. (SKILL.md, rules/ffmpeg.md, rules/maps.md)
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches resources from external domains, including remotion.media for assets and sound effects, assets4.lottiefiles.com for Lottie animations, and Google Fonts for typography. (rules/sfx.md, rules/lottie.md, rules/google-fonts.md)
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes @remotion/install-whisper-cpp to download and install specific versions of the Whisper.cpp binary and models to the local project directory for audio transcription. (rules/transcribe-captions.md)
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted external data.
  • Ingestion points: API responses fetched in calculateMetadata, Lottie JSON data from external URLs, and .srt subtitle files parsed via parseSrt. (rules/calculate-metadata.md, rules/lottie.md, rules/import-srt-captions.md)
  • Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when interpolating external data into the project.
  • Capability inventory: The skill environment has access to file system writes (fs.writeFileSync), network operations (fetch), and shell command execution (npx remotion). (rules/transcribe-captions.md, SKILL.md)
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict schema validation for external data before it influences the rendering process or metadata calculation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 22, 2026, 09:22 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — remotion-best-practices