remotion-best-practices
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 22, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute various shell commands using
npx,npm,yarn,pnpm, andbunto scaffold projects, install dependencies, and perform video rendering tasks. (SKILL.md, rules/ffmpeg.md, rules/maps.md) - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches resources from external domains, including
remotion.mediafor assets and sound effects,assets4.lottiefiles.comfor Lottie animations, and Google Fonts for typography. (rules/sfx.md, rules/lottie.md, rules/google-fonts.md) - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes
@remotion/install-whisper-cppto download and install specific versions of the Whisper.cpp binary and models to the local project directory for audio transcription. (rules/transcribe-captions.md) - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection by ingesting and processing untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: API responses fetched in
calculateMetadata, Lottie JSON data from external URLs, and.srtsubtitle files parsed viaparseSrt. (rules/calculate-metadata.md, rules/lottie.md, rules/import-srt-captions.md) - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify the use of delimiters or 'ignore' instructions when interpolating external data into the project.
- Capability inventory: The skill environment has access to file system writes (
fs.writeFileSync), network operations (fetch), and shell command execution (npx remotion). (rules/transcribe-captions.md, SKILL.md) - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict schema validation for external data before it influences the rendering process or metadata calculation.
Audit Metadata