render-mcp
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 10, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill implements a documentation retrieval workflow that ingests data from external URLs, creating a surface for potential indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The skill fetches external content from multiple locations including
https://render.com/docs/mcp-server.md,https://render.com/docs/cli.md, andhttps://render.com/docs/cli-reference.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit boundary delimiters or "ignore embedded instructions" warnings for the fetched external content.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
curlfor network requests and can execute commands via therenderCLI andclaudeCLI tools, as well as modify local configuration files like~/.cursor/mcp.json. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering logic is specified for the documentation content before it is processed by the agent.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill retrieves documentation and configuration guidelines from official Render domains.
- Evidence: Fetches Markdown and HTML resources from
render.comto provide up-to-date platform information. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to configure AI tools using system commands and configuration files.
- Evidence: Includes instructions for executing
claude mcp addto configure the server andrender whoamito verify identity. It also provides a template for modifying the~/.cursor/mcp.jsonconfiguration file.
Audit Metadata