reply-api
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 30, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches documentation and endpoint specifications from
docs.reply.io. As this domain is owned by the vendor (reply-team), these references are documented as standard operational behavior for fetching necessary metadata and guidelines. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is subject to indirect prompt injection risks because it instructs the agent to fetch and follow instructions from external markdown files (
https://docs.reply.io/api-reference/*.md) and a text index (https://docs.reply.io/llms.txt) to determine the structure and execution of API calls. - Ingestion points: External documentation fetched via HTTPS in
SKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified; external content is used directly to formulate command arguments.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses the
reply-clito perform potentially sensitive state-changing operations (POST, PATCH, DELETE) on the Reply.io platform, as noted in the Execution Guidance and Safety sections. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or validation of the fetched documentation content is described before it is used to construct shell commands.
Audit Metadata