assemble-changelog
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 13, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONCREDENTIALS_UNSAFEEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of the
Bashtool to run repository-specific scripts such asgenerate_changelog.py,upload_image.py, andlint-rerun. It also performs complex repository analysis using pipelines involvinggit,rg(ripgrep), andxargsto identify experimental features and unstable types. - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The skill instructs the agent to retrieve a GitHub authentication token by executing
gh auth tokenin the shell and passing it into acurlheader to access potentially private media attachments. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill uses
curlto fetch media attachments from GitHub domains (github.com/user-attachments/...) as part of the release workflow to migrate them to vendor-controlled storage. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes multiple markdown files from
docs/content/changelog/upcoming/which are authored by various contributors. These files are merged into the final changelog and their content is processed during a "polishing" phase, creating an attack surface for embedded instructions. - Ingestion points: Markdown files in the
docs/content/changelog/upcoming/directory are read and merged (SKILL.md). - Boundary markers: None; the content is merged directly into section headers without delimiters or "ignore instructions" warnings.
- Capability inventory: The skill is granted
Bash,Read,Edit, andWritepermissions, and executescurland local repository scripts. - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the ingested markdown content is performed before processing or merging.
- [COMMAND_INJECTION]: The skill resolves a
target versionfrom user-supplied$ARGUMENTSand interpolates it directly into shell commands (e.g.,pixi run uvpy scripts/generate_changelog.py --version 0.x.y), which could lead to command injection if the input is not strictly validated by the agent platform.
Audit Metadata